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Which Medical Ethics for 
the 21st Century? 
by 
Dianne N. Irving, M.A., Ph.D. 
The author is professor of Philosophy and Medical Ethics at the Pontifical 
Faculty, The Dominican House of Studies, Washington, D. C. She has also 
taught at the De Sales School of Theology, the Catholic University of 
America and Georgetown University. The following was presented at the 
Eighth Annual Rose Mass Brunch, March, 1999, sponsored by the John 
Carroll Society. 
Introduction 
Everyday we read and hear about the constant onslaught of controversial 
medical issues, e.g., euthanasia, physician-assisted suicide, test tube 
babies, cloning and stem cell research, creating monsters in the lab, etc. - it 
is all coming down very fast! This is not just business as usual! Yes, we 
will all have to make decisions about these and many other issues not even 
imagined yet in the 21 st century. But what will be the basis of our 
decisions, of our choices? Perhaps it is time to stop and seriously 
reconsider which medical ethics should be used as the basis of these 
choices - while we still can! This choice will be critical to the well-being 
of each of us individually, as well as to the well-being of our society at 
large. I cannot help but recall a favorite cauti on of St. Thomas 
(paraphrased) : "A small error in the beginning leads to a multitude of 
errors at the end!" Indeed, the ethical theory we choose will be the starting 
point for these complicated deci sions. As such it can cause us to reach 
conclusions and perform actions that are harmful and destructive - or 
those, which wil] enrich, fortify, and strengthen all of us. The choice, of 
course, is yours. 
Abstracting from all the possible academic ethical theories which will 
be vying for your patronage, I wi ll focus narrowly instead on two theories 
of medical ethics - secular bioethics and Roman Catholic medical ethics, 
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pointing out briefl y what they are, comparing their conclusions about what 
is ri ght or wrong, and indicating where they have already lead us. Frankly, 
I am convinced that secular bioethics can only lead us - individually and 
collectively - to profound destruction, and should in no way be confused 
with Roman Catholic medical ethics. In fact, I would encourage Catholics 
to stop using the term "bioethi cs" with reference to the Church's moral 
posi tions . I want to end by touching briefly on how the John Carroll 
Society itself embodies the very heart and soul of Roman Catholic medical 
ethics - and as such serves as a working role model for the rest of us. 
To beg in with, consider that ideas do have consequences - especially 
ideas about ethics when they are applied. Fundamentally different ethics 
lead to fundamentally different conclusions about what is right or wrong. 
Nowhere is thi s more obvious than in medical ethics. A quick comparison 
of the different conclusions already reached by secular bioethics and 
Roman Catholic medical ethics should make this graphically clear. 
Consider for a moment the strikingly different conclusions they 
reach. Secular bioethics considers the following as ethical: contraception; 
the use of abortifacients; prenatal diagnosis with the intent to abort 
defective babies; human embryo and human fetal research; abortion; 
human cloning; the formation of human chimeras (cross-breeding with 
other species); "brain birth"; "brain death"; purely experimental high risk 
research with the mentally ill ; euthanasia ; physic ian-assisted suicide; 
living wills documenting consent to just about anything; and, withholding 
and withdrawing food and hydration as extraordinary means. In contrast, 
Roman Catholic medical ethic , as expressed in the National Conference 
of Catholic Bishops ' Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health 
Care Services I considers all of these unethical - with the possible 
exception of the use of "brain death" criteria (and some Catholic 
theologians are now becoming concerned about that as well). Probably the 
only issues on which they both agree is that the use of extraordinary means, 
e.g. , a ventilator, is not morally required if a treatment is medically futile, 
and that even high doses of pain medication may be given if medically 
appropriate. How is it that these two ethical systems lead to such opposite 
and contradictory conclusions,) It is because their conclusions flow 
necessarily from very different ethical principles, or premises. 
A. Secular Bioethics 
Secular bioethics is an academic ethical theory that was made up in 
1979 by a group called the National Commission, and documented in their 
Belmont Report.2 They were attempting to identify " neutral" ethical 
principles that could be used in a pluralistic , multi-cultural society - where 
no one's ethics should be imposed on others. The Belmont Report 
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identified three ethical principles - respect for persons (which rapidly 
evolved to mean pure autonomy), justice and beneficence - otherwise 
known as "the Georgetown Mantra".3 These principles were supposedly 
drawn from the systems of various philosophers - e.g., Kant, John Stuart 
Mill , and John Rawls. In effect, they took bits and pieces from different 
ethical theories and rolled them up into one ball. Each of these principles 
they referred to as primafacie - i.e., no one principle could overrule any of 
the others. The way we come to know these ethical principles is by taking 
courses, attending conferences, and listening to bioethicists lecture. 
However, eventually and inevitably cracks began to form in the very 
foundation of this brand new ethical theory. For example, because 
bioethics was derived from bits and pieces of fundamental1y different and 
even contradictory theoretical systems, the result was theoretical chaos, 
rendering it academically indefensible. More problematic, when people 
tried to apply the theory it didn ' t work because practically speaking there 
was no way to resolve the inherent conflicts among these three principles. 
While the Commissioners of the Belmont Report gave a nod to the 
traditional Hippocratic understanding of Beneficence as "doing good for 
the patient", their definition is essentially and predominantly utilitarian, 
with particular emphasis placed in that Report on the "good" for society at 
large - or roughly, "the greatest good for the greatest number of people." 
Utilitarianism has always had a serious problem with defining in practice 
what "good" is, but it is generally reduced to some sort of lack of pain, or 
pleasure. It is clear, however, that their formula leaves minorities and the 
vulnerable out in the cold. There are no moral absolutes here - only "rules" 
or risklbenefit ratios, which are by definition relative. As utilitarian, the 
general norm or standard against which one determines if an individual 
action is right or wrong is "utility"; i.e., if that action is useful to achieving 
good consequences, those being defined as "the greatest good for the 
greatest number." The principle of Justice, too, is ultimately defined along 
utilitarian lines. Even the principle of Autonomy eventually ends up 
serving "the greatest good" - as I will indicate in a moment. At any rate, 
after all is said and done, bioethics is reduced to some form of utilitarianism or 
relativism, where "consequences" are the only morally relevant condition 
and the "good" of the individual person is clearly not top priority. 
There are several misconceptions about bioethics I would like to 
clarify. First, bioethics is not really just the "general moral consensus of 
the people", but rather it is an idiosyncratic systematic academic theory of 
ethics alongside many other such academic ethical theories or systems 
vying for recognition in the universities - bioethics simply being the one 
that was made up by the National Commission. Second, bioethics should 
not be equated with the entire field of "ethics" per se, as often seems to be 
the implication today, but again, it is only a sub-field of ethics. Third, 
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bioethics is not a "neutral" ethical theory at all, but defines itself as 
"normative"- i.e. , it takes a stand on what is right or wrong.4 In fact, there 
is no such thing as a "neutral" ethics - and that includes utilitarianism, 
consensus ethics, Kantianism, cultural relativism, emotivism, casuistry, 
and communitarianism as well. 
Eventually, as with most made up theories, bioethics is now in fact 
dysfunctional - it doesn ' t work, as admitted in publications by even many 
of the founders themselves - the best kept secret in bioethics! For example, 
Daniel Callahan (one of the founders of the bioethics "think tank", The 
Hastings Center, and former director of the American Eugenics SocietyS) 
conceded in the 25th anniversary issue of The Hastings Center Report 
celebrating the "birth of bioethics" that the principles of bioethics simply 
had not worked . But not to worry, he said, we ' ll try communitarianism 
now: "The range of questions that a communitarian bioethics would pose 
could keep the field of bioethics well and richly occupied for at least 
another 25 years! "6 AI Jonsen, one of the original members of the National 
Commission, admitted, in his "Preface" to the ftrst serious book confronting 
the myriad inadequacies of "bioethics principlism", that there were really 
only two real ethicists on that Commission , that they had essentially made 
the principles up, and agrees with the premise of the book that bioethics 
should now be regarded somewhat as a sick patient in need of a thorough 
diagnosis and prognosis: 
A fairly widespread perception exists. both within and without the 
bioethics community, that the prevailing U.S. approach to the ethical 
problems rai sed by modern medicine is ailing . Principlism is the 
patient. The diagnosis is complex, but many believe that the patient 
is seriously, if not terminally, ill. The prognosis is uncertain . Some 
observers have proposed a variety of therapies to restore it to health. 
Others expect its demise and propose ways to go on without it. 7 
Gilbert Meilaender's early and inci sive suspicions about the 
consequences of the several "mind/body splits" inherent in bioethics 
theory emerged in yet another important book, in which he explains "how 
easily the ' soul ' - attention to the meaning of being human, a meaning 
often illuminated by religious and metaphysical insight - can be lost in 
bioethics."8 Other controversies and battles over the validity of the 
bioethics principles on many levels are documented and collected in an 
already classic tome edited by Rannan Gillon ,9 in which 99 scholars from 
around the world jump into the fray. 
Equally problematic is the fact that only a very tiny percentage of 
"professional bioethics experts" have any academic degrees in bioethics at 
all, and even for those few that do there is no uniform or standardized 
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cuniculum, most teachers don 't really know the subject matter themselves, 
the courses vary from institution to institution, there are no local, state or 
national boards of examinations, and no standardized professional 
responsibilities are required. There is not even a code of ethics for 
bioethicists. Most "bioethicists" by far have never taken even one course 
in bioethics. lo 
Regardless, these bioethics principles of autonomy, justice and 
beneficence were made the explicit basis for many major government 
regulations, private sector and industry guidelines, even international 
guidelines still in use today - e.g., the federal OPRR regulations on the use 
of human subjects in medical research, The Common Rule, Institutional 
Review Board Guidebooks, Hospital Ethics Committee Guidebooks, most 
policies for hospitals and other health care facilities , the international 
CIOMSIWHO Guidelines for the use of human subjects in Third World 
countries, etc. I I The bioethics principles now literally redefined the 
"ethics" of other disciplines, e.g. , business ethics, and ethics in engineering. 
Even our country's military schools have restructured their ethics courses 
and essentially reduced them to courses in bioethics. Many colleges and 
universities already require a course in bioethics in order to graduate. 
More recently, the proposed statute concerning the use of 
"decisionally incapacitated" human subjects in medical research, introduced 
in the State of Maryland legislature in early March 1999, is grounded on 
these same three bioethics principles, as its first drafts explicitly state. This 
proposed statute purports to "respect the autonomy" of mentally ill human 
subjects to such an extreme that it would allow them to give informed 
consent to choose "research agents" who would then "substitute their 
judgments as to whether or not these mentally ill persons would have 
wanted to participate in even high risk, no direct benefit medical research 
for "the greater good of society", were they competent l2 - an absurd and 
dangerous interpretation of autonomy and altruism, indeed. 
Although bioethics wants to claim that it does not embody any 
anthropology - or definition of a "person" - it obviously does. One of the 
most popular by far comes from one of bioethics ' most infamous 
practitioners. Australian animal rights philosopherlbioethicist Peter Singer, 
president of the International Institute of Bioethics under the United 
Nations, and the director of Princeton University's Center for Human 
Values, defines a "person" as something actively expressing "rational 
attributes" (autonomy, choosing, loving, self-consciousness, relating to the 
world around one, etc.) and "sentience" (feeling pleasure and pain). 
Therefore, he enthusiastically advocates infanticide of even normal healthy 
newborn human beings - in fact, even older children. Why? Because they 
do not actively express "rational attributes" or "sentience", and therefore 
they may be human beings, but not "persons." On the other hand, he claims 
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that the higher primates, e.g., apes, monkeys, dogs, pigs, chickens - even 
prawns - are persons because they do actively exercise "rational attributes" 
and "sentience" : 
... For on any fair comparison of morally relevant characteristics , 
like rationality, se lf-consc iousness, awareness , autonomy, pleasure 
and pain, and so on, the calf, the pig and the much derided chicken 
come out well ahead of the fetus at any stage of pregnancy - which if 
we make the comparison with a fetus of less than three months, a fish 
or even a prawn would show more signs of consciousness. Since no 
fetus is a person. no fetus has the same claim to life as a person. 1.1 
... Now it must be admitted that these arguments apply to the 
newborn baby as much as to the fetus. A week-old baby is not a 
rat ional and self-conscious being; and there are many nonhuman 
animals whose rat ionality, se lf-consciousness , awareness, capacity to 
feel , and so on, exceed that of a human baby a week, a month, or 
even a year old. If the fetus does not have the same claim to life as a 
person, it appears that the newborn baby does not either, and the life 
of a newborn baby is of less value than the life of a pig, a dog, or a 
chimpanzee ... In thinking about thi s matter we should put aside 
feelings based on the small. helpless and - sometimes - cute 
appearance of human infants. To think that the lives of infants are of 
special value because infants are small and cute is on a par with 
thinking that a baby seal, with its soft white fur coat and large round 
eyes deserves greater protection than a whale which lacks these 
attributes. Nor can the helplessness or the innocence of the infant 
homo sapiens be a ground for preferring it to the equally helpless and 
innocent fetal homo sapiens. I. 
But it if is true that a "person" is defined only in terms of the actual 
exercising of "rational attributes" and "sentience", then the following list 
of human beings are also not human persons, and therefore not due the 
same ethical and legal rights and protections as persons : the mentally ill , 
mentally retarded, patients with Alzheimer's or Parkinson 's disease, the 
comatose, alcoholics, drug addicts, the frail elderly, paraplegics and all 
other disabled human beings, patients with nerve damage or disease, etc. 
Philosopherlbioethicist R.G. Freis correctly pushes Singer's logic to 
its inevitable conclusion: the mentally ill, etc., who are not "persons" 
should be substitutedfor the higher primates, who are "persons", in purely 
destructive experimental research. This is ethical - even morally required 
for " the greater good." Similarly, Norman Fost defines cognitively 
impaired human beings as "brain dead". Singer, who also enthusiastically 
promotes eugenics, uses all three bioethics priiicipies at will, depending on 
which one gets him where he wants to go. Thus adroitly he appeals to our 
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autonomy - e.g., if the parents of a defective newborn, or even a normal 
newborn, autonomously "choose" to kill their child, then that is ethical and 
we must respect their autonomous rights. However, if the parents won't do 
this on their own accord if it is for "the greater good", then the government 
has the duty to force them to do it, particularly if the child is defective! So 
much for rights ; in fact, Singer does not even believe in rights at all! 16 His 
colleague R.M. Hare is just as articulate when he discusses the role of the 
government in such issues. For Hare, the maximum duty that is to be 
impo ed by the government is to do the best impartially for all the 
"possible people" there might be by having an optimal family planning or 
population policy, which means necessarily excluding some possible 
people. Indeed, he argues, the best policy will be the one which produces 
that set of people, of all "possible sets" of people which will have in sum 
the best life, i.e. , the best possible set of future possible people! 17 
No wonder Singer has been run out of Gennany, Austria, and France, 
and is picketed just about every place he lectures. 
At any rate thi s explains in essence what bioethics is , what its ethical 
principles are, and why it comes to the conclusions it does in these medical 
ethics issues. Given that secular bioethics comes to so many conclusions 
opposite from those of Roman Catholic medical ethics, I would suggest 
that we reconsider using the term "bioethics" to refer to Roman Catholic 
medical ethics. One is definitely not the other. 
B. The Moral Law 
By contrast, the Church bases its ethical decisions on the moral law -
and the moral law itself is composed of two basic laws - the natural law, or 
what we can know is right or wrong through the aid of reason alone, and 
Divine Law as interpreted (not made up) by the Magisterium. 18 
The natural law does not mean the "laws of nature" or the "laws of 
the Cosmos" - as many New Age gnostic versions of natural law advance, 
nor does it refer to the " laws of society", but is grounded instead on the 
objective and objectively knowable nature of human beings. It is not 
something made up. Because it is based on our common humanity, natural 
law transcends different cultures, times, ethnic backgrounds, etc. - and is 
therefore truly applicable to all people at all times - including the 21st 
century. 
Here the common good is not defined as "the greatest good for the 
greatest number of people", but rather as those goods which all human 
beings, simply as human beings, have in common - e.g., food , water, 
shelter, clothing, friendship, etc. Maritain captures the stark difference 
between these two concepts of "the common good": 
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The end of soc iety is the good of the community. of the soc ial body. 
But if the good of the soc ial body is not understood to be a common 
good of human persons. just as the soc ial body it e lf is a whole of 
human persons, thi s conception also would lead to other en'ors of a 
totalitarian type. The common good of the city is neither the mere 
collection of private goods, nor the proper good of a whole 
which ... relates the parts to itself alone and sacrifices them to itse lf. 
It is the good human life of the mu ltitude, of a multitude of persons; 
it is their communion in good li ving. It is therefore common to both 
the I·vhole and the parts into which it flows back and which, in turn. 
must benefit from it. . .. It presupposes the persons and fl ows back 
upon them, and, in thi s sense. is achieved in them . . . . It is a 
fundamental thesis of Thomism that the person as such is a who le . 
The concept of part is opposed to that of person. To say. then , that 
soc iety is a whole composed of persons is to say that soc iety is a 
whole composed of wholes .... (I)f the person of itself requires "to be 
part of ' society, or " to be a member of society", thi s in no wise 
means that it must be in society in the way in which a part is in a 
whole and treated a a whole in soc iety. 
As human beings we are always persons. " Personhood" is 
coextensive with human nature. By virtue of possess ing intellect and will, 
we are "beings of a rational nature", or " rational animals"- and therefore 
by definition we are also persons simply by possessing thi s human nature l 9 
- whether we happen to be exercising it or not. Nor is "person" the same 
as the common understanding of "personality".20 
It is because we are persons who knowingly and willingly choose to 
perform certain actions that those actions are called " moral " or " immoral". 
Since our human natures always strive toward our human good or 
perfection - our "end"- we know empirically that those actions are morally 
right which lead us to our natural end, and those actions are morally wrong 
which lead us to harm instead, or go against the good of our human nature. 
For example, taking crack cocaine is wrong because it harms us, hurts us , 
prevents us from reaching our human ends or goods - not because God 
said so. A human act, then, derives its moral goodness from its conforrruty 
with human nature. And human nature cannot be changed (and still remain 
human) . 
The first ethical principle of the natural law, from which several 
other principles are drawn , is familiar to us all : "Do good and avoid evil."21 
Natural law also includes three (not one) general norms against which we 
determine what is right or wrong: ( I) the subjecti ve norm - not just 
"conscience", but a welljormed conscience; (2) the objective proximate 
norm - right reason, a very rich understanding of reason which embraces 
the harmony, interrelationship and good within any single individual, as 
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well as among individuals within a society. Here the "common goods" 
must flow back upon the backs of each and every member of that society, 
and the institutions are there to ensure that;22 and (3) the ultimate norm -
the Divine Nature itself, the ultimate measure of right and wrong, and of 
goodness. Of course, the Divine Nature is not the subject matter of natural 
law philosophical ethics, but of theology (which I will address in a 
moment). 
In applying these general nonns to concrete situations we decide what 
particular actions are right or wrong based on three (not one) conditions: 
the kind of action, the intention for doing the action; and the circumstances 
under which the action is done. All three conditions must be met for an 
action to be ethical; and although the intention and the circumstances are 
mostl y determinative, there are some - not many, but some - kinds of 
actions that are absolutely morally right or wrong. For example, kinds of 
act ions such as using human beings in research with the intention of 
helping to cure diseases is not inherently wrong, in fact it is laudable, as 
long as cel1ain circumstances prevail , e.g., the person has given infonned 
consent, and any harm sustained is proportionate to the medical good that 
can be derived. However, this does not mean that we can volunteer to 
mutilate or otherwise seriously harm ourselves. Nor does it mean that even 
earl y human embryos, who are scientifically human beings and therefore 
human persons, may be destroyed in order to help others in need. 23 It is 
inherently wrong to intentionally kill an innocent human being -
regardless of the intention or the circumstances - or her size. Evil may not 
be done that good may come of itY 
Natural law theory may seem at first a bit complicated, but then life 
is complicated, isn' t it? So shouldn't the theory reflect thi s reality? All in 
all, this is a very objective, realistic, interrelated, rich ethical theory -
grounded on our very natures as human, and known deep in the heart of 
every human being. 25 It is itself a pal1 of the eternal law, which includes 
both the physical laws of nature and the moral law. 
You might ask, though, if the natural law is naturally known, why is 
it that so many people don't seem to know it, act against it, even deny it? 
This is a good question, and does indeed point to the limits of using just the 
natural law as a moral guide in the 21st century. Many people have lost 
their sense of the natural law within them by habitually acting against their 
true good, by seeking only things that feel good, or by succumbing to the 
myriad of temptations constantly sUITounding us that seem good. 
Can ethics, then, be built on man alone? If a human act derives its 
moral goodness from its conformity with human nature, from where does 
human nature get its goodness? To really answer these questions we need 
also look further at the other part of the moral law - the Divine Law, as 
interpreted by the Magisterium. 
54 Linacre Quarterly 
The Divine Law is essentially what we learn through Divine 
Revelation , as interpreted by the Magisterium - the Bible, the Word of God 
(not, by the way, to be equated with theological theories). We accept it on 
faith , and faith of course is a gift. ft is roughly summarized for us in the 
Ten Commandments - commandments which are definitely not emblematic 
of some dictatorship, but rather are there to help us, to guide our human 
actions toward an even higher good than natural ones - eternal life with 
God - our ultimate end or GOOD. It is from the Divine Goodness of the 
Nature of God Himself that the natural goodness of our own human nature 
is derived. And so it is this whole moral law, taken in its entirety, which 
grounds the Church 's position on the li st of medical ethics issues I 
compared earlier. 
C. The Choice 
Now which of these ethical systems would you choose to guide you 
in considering the complicated ethical issues in the 21 st century - many of 
which are already here? The choice is yours. Should we enter the 21st 
century embracing the relativistic and utilitalian bioethics of the National 
Commission - an ethics which in no way really reflects the consensus of 
the majority of human beings, an ethics which is artificial, nol neutral , is 
theoretically indefensible and practically unworkable, and therefore 
already defunct? An ethics which absolutizes autonomy in the extreme, 
but where eventually even autonomy is rendered useless and absorbed into 
an absolute utilitarian ethics which abandons the good of the individual 
human being and eliminates any good of any minority?26 A theory where 
many human beings have less worth than a chicken or even a prawn - and 
so therefore they can be killed by "choice" or used as "biological 
materi als" in research to further " the greater good" of perfect people? 
Or will you choose an ethics which is objectively grounded on our 
very human natures, on what we know empirically is either harmful or 
good for us as human beings? One which defines the "common good" as 
those goods which we hold in common simply as human beings? A rich 
consistent ethics that is cognizant of and matches the complexities of daily 
living in the real world? One grounded on the immutable laws of man 's 
nature but which is capable of being drawn to immeasurable heights by its 
perfection in the Divine Law, the Word of God? 
D. The Individual Members of the John Carroll Society 
It is indeed this moral law, I would suggest, which is embodied in the 
many good works of the John Carroll Society. How? Well , according to 
the moral law, among all other creatures, rational creatures (that 's us!) are 
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subject to and participate in Divine Providence in a more excellent way (if 
they so choose) insofar as they are provident- by trying to take care of, do 
good for, themselves and others: 
... Now among all others, the rational creature is subject to divine 
providence in a more excellent way. in so far as it itself partakes of a 
share of providence, by being provident both for itself and for 
othersY (emphas is mine) 
And in a very special way you, the members of this Society, do precisely 
that. Through the kinds of actions such as sharing your gifts, your talents, 
your time and efforts, through your gifts of knowledge and medicine and 
law and all the other important professions, you have already produced 
enormous concrete good for our suffering and vulnerable brothers and 
sisters here in Washington. You have knowingly and willingly chosen to 
care for the sick, the troubled , the lonely, the forgotten, the abandoned, the 
di sabled, the vulnerable (We' re all vulnerable, aren't we?). 
By thus being provident for others you in fact do participate in the 
Divine Providence of God. Like Mother Teresa, your actions also help to 
fortify us all against our own deep dark unspoken fears of our earthly 
mortality, of the incontinence and dependency of aging, of the inevitable 
weakening of our bodies and our minds. In our vulnerable sisters and 
brothers we see ourselves, and we know that for the grace of God there go 
I! You have heard, "seen" through the light of understanding elevated by 
faith , and heeded the Word of God , instructing us that "As you did it to one 
of the least of these my brethren, you did it to Me ."28 Somehow you 
understand that the reason why you do this is, your intentions , are 
ultimately because you love God - the ultimate reason for all of our 
actions . You know that there is more to life than thi s life! 
Conclusion 
So which ethics will you choose to guide us through the turbulent 21st 
century before us - secular bioethics, or the moral law? The choice is yours 
- though it might be prudent to remember that it is not just that we have a 
choice. Of course we each have a choice or there would be no ethics at all! 
The real issue is whether or not that choice is good or bad. A small error in 
the choice of an ethics will lead to multiple - indeed- massive harm and 
destruction in the 2 I st century - for ourselves, as well as for our culture 
and society.29 Choose well, my friends . 
56 Linacre Quarterly 
References 
1. Nati onal Conference of Catholic Bishops, Ethical and Religious Directives fo r 
Catholic Health Care Services (Washington, D.C. : Uni ted States Catholi c 
Conference, [nc. , 1995); these directives are supposed to be made known by 
Catholic health care institutions and fo llowed by "the sponsors, trustees, 
admini strators, chaplains, physicians, hea lth care personnel, and patients or 
residents of these institutions and services.", p. 2. See also The Pontifical Council for 
Pastoral Ass istance, Cha rter fo r Health Care Workers (Boston: SI. Paul Books and 
Media, 1995). 
2. The National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and 
Behavioral Research, U. S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare. The 
Belmont Report: Ethical Principles and Guidelines fo r the Protection of Human 
Subj ects of Research (1979) . 
3. See generall y, Tom Beauchamp and James Childress, Principles of Biomedical 
Ethics (New York: Oxford Uni versity Press, 1979); Tom Beauchamp and Leroy 
Walters (eds.), Contemporary Issues in Bioethics (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth 
Publishing Company, Inc. , 1982. 
4. See Beauchamp and Childress, pp. 7-9; and Beauchamp and Walters, pp. 1-3. 
5. Mary Meehan's interview with Daniel Ca ll ahan, in "Eugenics: Still Alive and 
Well", National Catholic Register, August 8, 1993. 
6. Daniel Call ahan, "Bioethics: Private Choice and Common Good", Hastings Center 
Report (May-June 1994), Vo l. 24, 0. 3, p . 3 1. 
7. Edwin DuBose, Ronald Hamel and Laurence O ' Connell (eds.), A Maller of 
Principles?: Fern/em in U.S. Bioethics (Valley Forge, PA: Trinity Press International, 
1994), p. 1. 
8. Gilbert C. Meilaender, Body, Soul, and Bioethics, (Notre Dame, IN: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 1995), p. x. 
9. Raanan Gillon (ed.), Principles of Health Care Ethics (New York: John Wiley & 
Sons, 1994). 
10. See Dianne N. Irving, "Scientific and Philosophical Experti se: An Evaluation of 
the Arguments on 'Personhood' ", The Linacre Quarterly (1993), Vol. 60. pp. 18-47. 
II . E.g., to name but a few: United States Code of Federal Regulations: Protection 
of Human Subjects 45 CFR 46 ( 198 1, revised 1983, reprinted 1989 - now 
incorporated into the Com.mon Rule Washingron, D.C. , DHHS); The President 's 
Commissioll for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and 
February, 2003 57 
Behavioral Research, 1983 ; National Institutes of Health: Report of the Human 
Fetal Transplant Research Panel (Washington, DC: NIH, Dec. 1988); NIH Guidefor 
Grants and Contracts (Washington, DC: NIH, 1990); NIH Revitalization Act, Public 
Law 103-43 (June, 1993); Office for the Protection From Research Risks (OPRR), 
Protecting Human Research Subjects: Institutional Review Board Guidebook 
(Washington , DC, NIH, 1993); NIH Guidelines on the Inclusion of Women and 
Minorities as Subjects in Clinical Research, Federal Reg. 59 FR 14508 (Washington, 
DC: NIH, March, 1994); NIH Ou/reach Notebook on the Inclusion of Women and 
Minori/ies in Biomedical and Behavioral Research (Washington , DC, NIH, 1994); 
Na/ional Insti/utes of Health: Report of the Human Embryo Research Panel 
(Washington, DC: NIH, Sept. 1994); CIOMSIWHO International Ethical Guidelines 
for Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjec/s (Geneva: CJOMSIWHO, 1993). 
12. See especially the first draft , Office of the Maryland Attorney General. J . 
Joseph Curran , Jr. , Attorney Genera l. and Jack Schwartz, Assistant Attorney 
General , Initial Report o f the Attorney General's Research Working Group (October 
1996), revised May 1997. June 1998. 
13. Peter Singer, 'Taking Life: Abortion," in Practical Ethics (London: Cambridge 
University Press, 1985), p. 118; see also, Helga Kuhse and Peter Singer, "For 
Sometimes Letting - and Helping - Die." Law, Medicine and Health Care, 1986, Vol. 
3, No.4, 149-153: Kuhse and Singer, Should /he Baby LiFe? The Problem of 
Handicapped Infants (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), P. 138. 
14. Ibid. , Singer, Practical Ethics, p. 123. 
15 . R.G. Frey, "The Ethics of the Search for Benetits: Animal Experimentation in 
Medicine," in Raanon Gillon (ed.), Principles of Health Care Ethics (New York : John 
Wiley & Sons, 1994), pp. 1067-1075. 
16. David S. Oderberg, "A Messenger of Death at Princeton," Washington Times, July 
30,1998,A I7. 
17. H.R. Hare, "When Does Potentiality Count? A Comment on Lockwood," 
Bioethics (1988), Vol. 2, No.3 , p. 214. 
18. See generally, Humanae Vitae (Boston: Pauline Books & Media , 1968): " It is , 
in fact , indisputable, as our predecessors have many times declared , that Jesus 
Christ, when communicating to Peter and to the apostles His divine authority and 
sending them to teach all nation s Hi s commandments , constituted them as 
guardians and authentic interpreters of all the moral law, not only, that is, of the 
law of the Gospel, but also of the natural law, which is also an expression of the 
will of God, the faithful fu!fillment of which is equally necessary for salvation. " 
(emphasis mine) (p. 2); the NCCB 's Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic 
Health Care Services: "The moral teachings that we profess here tlow principally 
from the natural law, understood in the light of the revelation Christ has entrusted to 
58 Linacre Quarterly 
his Church ." (emphasis mine) (p . 2); Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, IaIIae, 
q.94, Fathers of the English Dominican Province (trans.) (Westminster, MD: Christian 
Classics, 198 I); Austin Fagothey, Right and Reason (3rd ed. only) (St. Louis, MO: 
The c.v. Mosby Company, 1963); Vernon Bourke, Ethics (New York: The Macmillan 
Company, 1953); Ralph McInerny, Ethica Thomistica (Washington, DC: The Catholic 
University of America Press, 1982). 
19. Thomas Aquinas, ST. Ia.q.29, a.l , ans., ad . 2,3 ,5, p. 156; ibid., a.2, ans. ; also ST, 
IIIa.q .19, a. l , adA.2127. 
20. See Kevin Doran, "Person - a Key Concept for Ethics", Linacre Quarterly (1989), 
Vol. 56, No. 4, p. 39. 
21. See Vernon Bourke, Ethics (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1953), pp. 172-
179. 
22. See Jacques Maritain, The Person and the Common Good (Notre Dame, IN: 
University of Notre dame Press, 1972), pp. 50-58. 
23. Donum Vitae (Boston : Pauline Books & Media, 1987). See also, Dianne N. 
Irving, Philosophical and Scientific Analysis of the Nature of the Early Human 
Embryo (Doctoral dissertation) (Washington, DC: Georgetown University, 1991); 
Irving, testimony as member of the Science Panel, "Cloning: Legal, Mediad, Ethical, 
and Social Issues" , Hearing before the Subcommittee on Health and Environment of 
the Committee on Commerce, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington , DC, Feb. 
12, 1998; Ward C. Kischer and Dianne N. Irving, The Human Development Hoax: 
Time to Tell the Truth! (1997), (2nd ed.) (distributed by the American Life League, 
Stafford, VA). 
24. See DeclaraTion on Euthanasia (Boston : St. Paul Books & Media, 1980); 
Declaration on Procured Abortion (Boston: Daughters of St. Paul , 1974). 
25. Romans 2: 14-15. 
26. But see Veritatis Splendor (Boston: St. Paul Books & Media, 1993). 
27. ST, I-II, q .91 , a.2. 
28. Matthew 25:40. 
29. See Evangelium Vitae (Boston: St. Paul Books & Media, 1995). 
February, 2003 59 
